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When we make a decision, we experience a degree of confidence that our choice may
lead to a desirable outcome. Recent studies in animals have probed the subjective
aspects of the choice confidence using confidence-reporting tasks. These studies
showed that estimates of the choice confidence substantially modulate neural activity
in multiple regions of the brain. Building on these findings, we investigated the neural
representation of the confidence in a choice in humans who explicitly reported the
confidence in their choice. Subjects performed a perceptual decision task in which they
decided between choosing a button press or a saccade while we recorded EEG activity.
Following each choice, subjects indicated whether they were sure or unsure about the
choice. We found that alpha activity strongly encodes a subject’s confidence level in
a forthcoming button press choice. The neural effect of the subjects’ confidence was
independent of the reaction time and independent of the sensory input modeled as a
decision variable. Furthermore, the effect is not due to a general cognitive state, such as
reward expectation, because the effect was specifically observed during button press
choices and not during saccade choices. The neural effect of the confidence in the
ensuing button press choice was strong enough that we could predict, from independent
single trial neural signals, whether a subject was going to be sure or unsure of an ensuing
button press choice. In sum, alpha activity in human cortex provides a window into the
commitment to make a hand movement.
Keywords: perceptual decision-making, certainty, neural correlates, human, EEG
1. Introduction
The ability to make a good choice among multiple alternatives is critical to animals’ survival
and to human well-being. Over the past decade, systems neuroscience has begun to uncover the
neural correlates of the variables that characterize subjects’ decision-making (Platt and Glimcher,
1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Heekeren et al., 2004, 2008; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Tosoni
et al., 2008; Wang, 2008; Andersen and Cui, 2009; Ho et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2009;
Ratcliff et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2009; O’Connell et al., 2012). In these studies, researchers
estimate the variable on which subjects base their decision in a given task, a “decision variable”
(DV). When the proportion of choices of one of the options is plotted against the DV, one
universally observes a graded and continuous (e.g., sigmoidal) relationship, a psychometric curve.
These results suggest that a DV may reflect a graded commitment, or a degree of the subject’s
confidence, to choose a given option. In consequence, the neuronal modulations that correlate with
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DVs (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Heekeren et al., 2004, 2008;
Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Wang, 2008; Andersen and Cui, 2009;
Ho et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Ratcliff et al., 2009;
Tosoni et al., 2008; Wunderlich et al., 2009; O’Connell et al.,
2012) may reflect a subject’s confidence in their choice.
In a fewmore recent studies, researchers probed the subjective
aspects associated with the degree of commitment (i.e., the
choice confidence) more directly, using confidence-reporting
tasks in animals (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen,
2009; Middlebrooks and Sommer, 2012; Komura et al., 2013).
Electrophysiological recordings revealed that choice confidence
is an important and potentially novel factor in modulating neural
activity in multiple regions of the brain. Of particular interest,
one of these studies (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009) found that the
modulation of neuronal firing rates in lateral intraparietal area
(LIP) by a DV that characterized the amount of information
in a visual stimulus in many previous studies (e.g., Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001; Gold and Shadlen, 2007) could in part be
captured by the degree of a monkey’s confidence in a choice,
i.e., whether a monkey is sure or unsure to make a choice
(Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). Furthermore, a regression model
suggested that themodulation of LIP firing rates due to the choice
confidence could not be entirely explained by the modulation of
LIP firing rates due to the DV. The choice confidence correlated
with LIP firing rates in a manner partially independent of
the DV.
These findings demonstrate that choice confidence can be an
important and possibly independent new factor in modulating
neuronal activity in decision tasks. Given these findings, we
tested how choice confidence modulates neural signals recorded
in a perceptual decision task in humans. One of the main
benefits of approaching this issue in humans is that humans
are capable of accessing and explicitly reporting their confidence
in a choice (McDougall, 1921; Vickers, 1979; Baranski and
Petrusic, 1994; Koriat, 2011; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012;
De Martino et al., 2013). While the subjects performed the
task, we recorded cortical activity using electroencephalography
(EEG). We designed the task to control for potential confounds.
In particular, we controlled for eye movement by imposing
fixation, for activity of peripheral muscles, for a particular kind
of choice (hand, eye movement), and for reaction time. We
found that subjects’ confidence in committing to a button press is
predicted by and can be inferred from parietal alpha activity.
2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Ten right-handed human subjects participated in the study.
The subjects comprised 4 females and 6 males, aged 23–72
(mean 41.1). All subjects were healthy, had normal hearing
capacity, and gave informed consent through a protocol reviewed
and approved by the Wadsworth Center Institutional Review
Board. Subjects were paid for their participation.
2.2. Data Collection
Subjects sat in a comfortable chair 60 cm in front of a flat-screen
monitor. They wore a 16-channel EEG cap (see Section 2.7).
Subjects wore headphones (MDR-V600, Sony) that presented
a stereo auditory stimulus (see Section 2.4). The right arm
rested comfortably on a pillow that was placed on a fixed
table. The subjects’ right hand was steadily holding a joystick
(ATK 3, Logitech); subjects were ready to simultaneously
press the front and top buttons of the joystick using their
right index finger and the right thumb, respectively. Gaze
position of each eye was measured using an eye tracker (Tobii
T60, Tobii Technology, Inc., Sweden) that was integrated
into the flat-screen monitor. Acquisition of EEG signals, eye
gaze parameters, joystick button press parameters, as well as
control of the experimental design were accomplished with
the BCI2000 (RRID:nif-0000-00251) system (Schalk et al.,
2004).
2.3. Task
The task is a variant of that used previously (Kubanek et al.,
2013). In comparison to that previous task, the present task
incorporates the confidence reporting period, and eliminates
the variable delay period. As in the previous task, subjects
had to fixate prior to a response, which effectively eliminates
a possible eye movements confound. In the present task, we
in addition controlled for the possible early movements of the
hand or the body by measuring the EMG activity of the forearm
muscles.
Each trial (Figure 1A) began with the presentation of a red
fixation cross, subtending 2◦ of visual angle. Subjects had to fixate
at the center of the cross, and keep the eye gaze within a radius
of 2◦. An absence of eye gaze within the fixation radius for more
than 150ms was considered as a break of fixation. After acquiring
fixation, two icons appeared, 15◦ to the right and 15◦ to the left
of the fixation cross. The right icon was a sketch of a joystick
with highlighted top and front red buttons. The left icon was
a sketch of the eye. At the same time, subjects were presented
with a stereo auditory stimulus (click sounds, see Section 2.4),
1.0 s in duration. Subjects had to determine whether they heard
more clicks in the right ear or more clicks in the left ear. After
the stimulus, the fixation cross shrank to 1◦ in diameter and
changed its color to green. This event cued the subjects to make
a movement (choice). If subjects heard more clicks in the right
ear than in the left ear, they simultaneously pressed the front
and the top button of the joystick using the right index finger
and the right thumb, respectively. In the analyses, movement
onset was taken as the time of the earlier button press. On the
other hand, if subjects heard more clicks in the left ear than in
the right ear, they made an eye movement to the left icon. A
successful choice was communicated to the subject by shrinking
the icon corresponding to the chosen movement (the eye icon
or the joystick icon) from 2◦ in size to 1◦ in size. If subjects
broke fixation or pressed any button before or within 200ms
after the appearance of the go cue, or if they failed to indicate a
response within 800ms after the go cue, the trial was aborted and
excluded from the analyses. A trial was also aborted if subjects
responded with both movements, or if subjects made a saccade
to the right icon. The type of error was indicated to the subjects
in red, large-font text (“TOO EARLY,” “TOO LATE,” “MOVED
BOTH”).
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 July 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 243
Kubanek et al. Alpha activity reflects choice confidence
A
B
C
D
FIGURE 1 | Decision task and choice behavior. (A) After acquiring a
fixation cross, subjects listened to a binaurally presented auditory stimulus.
Subjects decided whether they heard more click sounds in the right ear or in
the left ear. If subjects heard more clicks in the right ear, they pressed two
buttons of the joystick with their right index finger and the thumb. Otherwise,
they made a saccade to the eye icon on the left side of the screen. After the
choice, subjects indicated whether they were sure or unsure about the
choice by moving the joystick to YES or NO tags, respectively. One of these
tags randomly appeared in the upper part and the other in the lower part of
the screen. (B) Temporal progression of the decision variable (DV) on each
trial during the stimulus interval, separately for trials that resulted in a button
press (red) and trials that resulted in a saccade (blue). For clarity, the figure
shows 100 randomly selected trials for each choice. (C) Mean ± s.e.m
proportion of button press choices as a function of the binned DV at the end
of the stimulus period. The individual data points were fitted with a logistic
function. (D) Mean ± s.e.m reaction time as a function of the absolute value
of the DV at the end of the stimulus period. The individual data points were
fitted with a line.
After making a choice, a text “WERE YOU SURE?” was
displayed in the center of the screen, along with “YES” and
“NO” tags in the periphery. The location of these two tags was
randomized on each trial. Specifically, one of these tags randomly
appeared in the upper part of the screen and the other tag
appeared in the lower part of the screen. Subjects were instructed
to move the joystick in the direction of the appropriate tag and to
press the two buttons of the joystick to confirm their selection. If
subjects did not select a tag within 5 s, the trial was aborted and
discarded.
After subjects indicated their confidence, they were given
feedback, 0.6 s in duration, which was a string indicating a
particular number of points followed by the “c” symbol. A correct
choice entailed a gain of 10 points. An incorrect choice incurred
a loss of 10 points. Furthermore, when the online algorithm
(see below) estimated that a decision was difficult (−0.5< E<
0.5) and subjects indicated NO, or if a decision was estimated
to be easy (E<−0.5 or E> 0.5) and subjects indicated YES,
additional 10 points were added to the sum; otherwise, 10
points were subtracted. The offset of feedback was followed by
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a variable inter-trial interval, 0.6–1.2 s in duration. The feedback
was shown to alleviate the possible argument that subjects had
little incentive to accurately report their level of confidence,
compared to studies in animals in which animals were specifically
rewarded for reporting particular levels of confidence (Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009). Nevertheless, since the subjects were only told
that they were paid for their participation (they were not paid
for and no statement was made in regard to the payment for their
performance), they may have ignored the feedback points, and so
the confidence reports could still be sub-optimal. However, the
objective measures of the confidence reports (Figure 2) suggest
that the confidence reports properly reflected the amount of
information in the stimulus. Notably, our neural effects cannot
be explained by a subject’s anticipation of a particular feedback
outcome, because there was no effect during saccade choices
(Figure 7).
Subjects made a valid choice in 85.1 ± 3.0% (mean ± SEM
across the 10 subjects) of trials. The error rate for the too late
responses was 5.0± 1.5%, for the too early responses 6.6± 2.1%,
for the responses with both effectors 0.5 ± 0.2%, and for making
a saccade to the wrong (rightward) icon 2.7 ± 0.9%. Each of
the 10 subjects completed at least two sessions of 100 valid
trials each. Two subjects completed an additional session of 50
valid trials, and five subjects an additional session of 100 valid
trials.
2.4. Auditory Stimulus
The stimuli used in this study are identical to those used
previously (Kubanek et al., 2013). Briefly, the auditory stimulus
presented to each ear consisted of a train of brief (0.2ms) click
sounds drawn from a homogeneous Poisson process. Each train
lasted 1.0 s. The stereo stimulus was composed such that the sum
of clicks presented to the left ear (Cl) plus the sum of clicks
presented to the right ear (Cr) summed to one of four fixed values
Cl + Cr = ,  ∈ {25, 32, 39, 46}. The value of  was drawn
randomly on each trial.
A B
FIGURE 2 | The choice confidence reflected in behavior. (A) Mean ±
SEM proportion of subjects’ correct choices as a function of subjects’
confidence. (B) Mean ± SEM reaction time as a function of subjects’
confidence.
2.5. Online Adaptive Algorithm
An online algorithm ensured that subjects were often confident
and often not confident about their decision in different trials.
To achieve that, prior to the start of each trial, we randomly
drew a number E from a uniform distribution over the interval
(−1,+1). The program then randomly selected one of the 10
pre-generated auditory stimuli with Cr and Cl that—according
to the current model—most closely correspond to the generated
E. Using the same online adaptive model as in a previous study
(Kubanek et al., 2013):
E =
2
1+ exp
(
−β
Cr −Cl
Cr +Cl
) − 1,
it follows that
Cr =
1
β
ln
(
(E+ 1)/2
1− (E+ 1)/2
)
,
where = Cr + Cl and thus Cl = − Cr .
The difficulty of the presented stimuli was adjusted to the
performance of each subject. Our objective was to keep each
subject at 75% of correct responses. To achieve this, the program
adapted the value of β (initial value β = 8) to each subject’s
performance over the last 20 trials according to the following
update rule:
βnew = βold1.2
(A−75)/10
where A is the accuracy, in %, over the past 20 trials. This
procedure allowed subjects to perform close to the desired
accuracy (76.6 ± 1.2% (mean± SEM) over the 10 subjects).
2.6. Decision Variable
To describe the choice behavior of subjects in this task, we
devised a decision variable (DV) according to signal detection
theory (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). In particular, a simple DV
constructed from discrete, independent pieces of evidence (click
sounds) can be expressed in terms of the logarithm of the
likelihood ratio (logLR):
DV(t) = log LR(t) =
i(t)∑
i= 1
log
P(ei | button)
P(ei | saccade)
,
where the sum runs from the first click up to the last click i(t)
occurring prior to or at time t, ei is the i-th click (rightclick
or leftclick), and P(rightclick | button) is the probability that a
click is a right click given a button press choice (and analogously
for the 3 other combinations of the arguments of P). These
probabilities were computed from the frequencies of the summed
right (or left) clicks over all trials of a given choice.
This DV captured both the subjects’ choice behavior and the
reaction time (Figures 1B–D). Our results did not change when
we considered a different definition of the DV (Kubanek et al.,
2013). Both forms of DV predicted subjects’ choice behavior
similarly well, and both produced similar neural effects. We
here used the formalism of the sequential analysis of the signal
detection theory (Gold and Shadlen, 2002, 2007).
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2.7. Electrophysiological Recordings
As in a previous study (Kubanek et al., 2013), neural data were
recorded using a 16-channel EEG cap (Electro-Cap International,
Inc., Eaton, OH). The channels were positioned according to the
International 10–20 method of electrode placement (F3, Fz, F4,
T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP3, CP4, P3, Pz, P4, PO7, PO8, Oz). The left
and right mastoids served as ground and reference, respectively.
The signals were re-referenced to a common average reference
(CAR): for a given channel, the voltage waveform resulting from
averaging the voltage waveforms over all channels was subtracted
from the voltage waveform at that given channel (Kubanek et al.,
2013). The neural signals were anti-alias-filtered and acquired
with a g.USBamp series B amplifier (g.tec, Austria) at 24-bit
resolution at a rate of 256Hz.
The lack of an effect during saccades presents a powerful
negative control against a possible general artifact. Nonetheless,
we additionally tested the effects of an artifact removal procedure
on our results (Murray et al., 2008). The procedure first removes
low frequency trends in the raw EEG signals using a high-
pass filter (we used an IIR high-pass with a cutoff frequency
of 0.05Hz). Subsequently, the procedure removes all trials in
which during the stimulus period the EEG signals at any channel
exceed+100µV or fall below−100µV. This procedure removed
14.1% of trials. This procedure hadminimal impact on the results
(see Section 3). Lowering the exclusion criterion yet further,
to 75µV, removed 30.3% of trials, and again led to the same
principal effects (not shown).
2.8. Measurement of Hand EMG
In this task, we recorded, besides electroencephalographic (EEG)
activity of the cortex, also the electromyographic (EMG) activity
of anterior forearm muscles. Bipolar measurements were made
through two surface leads (GS27 pre-gelled disposable sEMG
sensors) placed 2 cm apart along the flexor carpi radialis, and
two surface leads placed 2 cm apart along the flexor digitorum
superficialis (which in part potentially also reflects activity of the
palmaris longus). For both muscles, the lead further apart from
the wrist served as the reference. The EMG signals were acquired
using an additional g.USBamp series B amplifier (g.tec, Austria)
at 24-bit resolution at a rate of 256Hz. The EMG signals were
filtered in a typical frequency range in which EMG is observed
using an IIR band-pass filter (20–100Hz, 80 dB cut-off at 19 and
105Hz). Using a lower cutoff, of 5Hz, had only minimal impact
on the EMG effects. The EMG power was evaluated in the same
timewindows as the EEG power. The twomuscles showed similar
effects. We report the activity of the more sensitive flexor carpi
radialis.
We defined the time at which two traces start to significantly
deviate (Figures 5B,C) by finding the first time sample for which
aWilcoxon rank sum test (we used this test because the compared
conditions are independent, with different numbers of trials)
returns a p-value lower than 0.01, and this condition holds for
at least 10 consecutive time samples.
2.9. Time-frequency Analysis of the Neural Data
In this analysis (Figure 3A), the neural signals were evaluated
in 300ms windows sliding through the trial in 30ms steps. In
each window, we estimated the power spectral density for each
frequency in the range from 1 to 80Hz using an autoregressive
(AR) model of the order 15, applying Burg’s method (function
pburg in Matlab). The choice of the AR order did not
significantly influence the results of Figure 3A. The analysis
window was chosen to be wide enough to provide reliable
estimates of the power spectral density for low frequencies (e.g.,
for a 4Hz signal, the 300ms window spans at least one full
period), and short enough to capture the temporal variability
in the neural signals. For increased temporal resolution, in
Figures 5B,C, we used a shorter window of 100ms.
2.10. Computation of the Power in the Alpha
Band
We computed the power in the alpha band by first filtering the
signals of each EEG channel in the alpha band (8–12 Hz; 80
dB cutoffs at 7 and 13Hz) using an IIR filter. To avoid phase
distortion, we applied the filter using the filtfilt function
in Matlab (The MathWorks, Natick, MA). This filtering method
performed zero-phase digital filtering by processing the input
data in both the forward and reverse directions.
We then computed the power of the filtered signals in 300ms
windows sliding through the trial in 30ms steps. For increased
temporal resolution, the alpha power in Figure 5Bwas computed
in shorter, 100ms windows, and is in this figure visualized as
a relative decrease in power (“modulation”) with respect to the
mean power for a given subject (Kubanek et al., 2013). Thus,
the higher the modulation, the more desynchronized the neural
signals in the alpha band.
2.11. Linear Models
In Figure 3A, we investigated the neural representation of the
choice confidence in a multiple regression on the neural activity
on each trial:
Neural = α1Confidence+
10∑
i= 1
βi, (1)
where Confidence takes one of two values [sure (value of 1),
unsure (value of 0)], and βi are the intercept terms for the
individual subjects. We included these additional terms in all
analyses that present the significance of an effect, to make sure
that the effects we report are not due to cross-subject variability.
Similar effects of the choice confidence were obtained when these
terms were not included in the regression.
In Figure 3A the regression was performed separately for
signals at each time and frequency. Therefore, in that figure,
Neural represents the power at a given time window and
frequency, for a given trial. In Figures 3B,C, 7, the neural signals
were filtered in the alpha band (see above), and so in those
analyses Neural represents the alpha power at each time window,
for a given trial.
In Figure 3 the signal power was averaged, for a given time
and frequency, over all channels. In Figures 7, 8, the alpha power
was also averaged over all channels.
In Figures 3C, 7, we investigated the specific representation
of the choice confidence by accounting for the decision variable
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FIGURE 3 | Subjects’ confidence in a button press choice reflected in
cortical signals. In all panels, effects are shown as a function of time
throughout the trial. Data are aligned on the stimulus onset (left), and on the
time of the button press (right). The figure shows effects during all button press
choices. (A) The significance of the weight (p-value associated with the
t-statistic, see color bar) of the choice confidence regressed on the neural
activity (i.e., the contrast between sure and unsure trials), at each time
throughout the trial and at each frequency in the range from 1 to 80Hz. The
thick vertical bar spanning the range 8–12Hz denotes the alpha band. (B) The
significance of the weight (p-value associated with the t-statistic) of the choice
confidence (solid) or the DV (dash-dot), separately regressed on the neural
signals measured in the alpha band, as a function of time. (C) The significance
of weight of individual factors in a multiple regression on the neural signals
measured in the alpha band, as a function of time. The factors include the
choice confidence, the DV, the reaction time (RT), the horizontal eye position,
and the EMG activity of the forehand muscle flexor carpi radialis. The solid bar
below the abscissa denotes the period of significance of the choice
confidence effect during the stimulus period. (D) The mean activity of the
forehand muscle flexor carpi radialis and the mean horizontal eye gaze
position. In all panels, signal power was computed in 300ms sliding windows
(30ms overlap) and averaged over all channels. The behavioral traces in (D)
were computed as means over the corresponding 300ms windows.
(DV), the reaction time (RT), the horizontal eye gaze position,
the EMG activity of the forearm muscle flexor carpi radialis, and
each subject in a multiple regression on the neural signal on each
trial:
Neural = α1Confidence+ α2DV+ α3RT+ α4handEMG
+α5eyepos+
10∑
i= 1
βi, (2)
where, in addition to Equation (1), DV is the instantaneous value
of the DV (see above), RT is the time elapsed from the Go cue
until a behavioral response, handEMG is the instantaneous EMG
activity of the flexor carpi radialis muscle (see above), and eyepos
is the instantaneous value of the horizontal eye position averaged
over both eyes.
Following a regression fit (Equation 1 or 2), we evaluated the
significance of the weight of the choice confidence (Figure 3A)
and of the other factors (Figures 3B, 7) and report the p-value of
the associated t-statistic.
In Figure 10, we test the effects of the individual variables on
the choice confidence in the following linear model:
Confidence = α1Neural+ α2DV+ α3RT+ α4handEMG
+α5eyepos+ RandomEffectsDueToSubject,
(3)
where RandomEffectsDueToSubject are 60 additional random
effect terms corresponding to grouping of each variable (5 plus
intercept) by each subject (10 levels). The other terms are as
defined previously, with their value computed as an average over
the period of the significance of the effect of confidence (bar
below the abscissa in Figure 3C). This averaging over a relatively
long time period during the stimulus interval is not critical; we
performed it to avoid an arbitrary selection of a particular time.
Very similar results are obtained when a particular time within
this broad window is selected for this analysis. Each variable
was normalized between its 2.5th percentile (value 0) and 97.5th
percentile (value 1). This scaling was performed to enable a fair
comparison of the corresponding weights.
2.12. Visualization of Topographies
We visualized data at each channel (Figure 5A) using the
topoplot function available at http://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/
allfunctions/topoplot.html.
2.13. Prediction of Confidence
For all training set trials (see Section 2.14 for details) of a
given subject, we averaged the alpha power over all channels
in the period of the significance of the effect of confidence
(thick horizontal bar in Figure 3B). These neural values form
two distributions, one for sure and one for unsure choices
(Figure 8A). A classification criterion is then set at a particular
point between the medians of the two distributions. That point
is chosen by the experimenter according to the experimenter’s
demands on the level of type I and type II error (Figure 8B),
that is, the rates of misclassifying the sure choices as unsure, and
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reversely. Using this scheme, a new, independent signal value of
a test set (see Section 2.14) is then compared to the classification
criterion. The scheme predicts that a subject is going to be sure
(unsure) to choose the button press if the value is higher (lower)
than the criterion.
2.14. Accuracy Assessment
A correct prediction of choice confidence from the neural signal
occurs when the scheme’s confidence prediction from the neural
signal (sure, unsure) matches the confidence indicated by the
subject (sure, unsure). We assessed the accuracy of the prediction
scheme using the leave-one-out procedure. In this procedure,
trials (total number N) are divided into N − 1 training trials
and 1 test trial. This division is repeated N times such that
each time the 1 test trial is different than the previously tested
trials. The scheme is trained on each of the training sets, and the
accuracy is taken as the average correct classification of the test set
trials.
Validating the predictions using new test set (independent of
the training set) signals ensures that the same level of prediction
accuracy could be achieved in real time settings.
2.15. Randomization Analysis
We performed a permutation test to evaluate the significance of
the prediction accuracy values in each subjects and to further
ensure that these values reflect a relationship between the neural
signals and the choice confidence. Specifically, we distorted this
relationship by randomly reassigning, within each subject, the
sure and unsure labels across the trials. We performed this
procedure 10 thousand times. In each case, we computed the
prediction accuracy in the same way as using the original data.
Within each subject, we fit the distribution of the ten thousand
accuracy values with the normal distribution, and used this
normal distribution to assess whether the accuracy on the original
data is higher than would be expected by chance (p < 0.05). The
accuracy values that are according to this procedure significant
are marked as filled blue bars in Figure 8C.
The individual accuracy values given by the randomization
procedure were averaged together. The obtained average
accuracy values in each subjects are shown as magenta bars in
Figure 8C. Following this randomization procedure, the average
accuracy fell to chance level, 50% on average across the subjects
(range 49.9–50.1%). The same result is obtained when only the
test set labels are randomized, i.e., when each test set label is
randomly drawn from the pool of sure and unsure labels for a
given subject.
3. Results
Humans performed a perceptual decision task in which they
decided on the polarity of a stereo auditory stimulus (Kubanek
et al., 2013). Subjects had to fixate a central target. When subjects
heard more click sounds in the right ear compared to the
left ear, they pressed a button. Otherwise, they made an eye
movement (Figure 1A). Critically, following a choice, subjects
indicated whether they were sure or unsure about their choice
(Figure 1A). Confidence was reported using a joystickmovement
whose direction was randomized on each trial, and so there
was no relationship between subjects’ choices and confidence
reports.
We described the subjects’ choice behavior in this task using a
decision variable (DV), according to sequential analysis of signal
detection theory (Section 2). This DV represents an integral over
time of the individual quanta of evidence supporting a given
choice alternative. The time course of the DV on trials that
resulted in a button press (red) and trials that resulted in a saccade
(blue) is shown in Figure 1B. The figure reveals that the subjects’
behavior followed the instruction—subjects typically selected the
button press when the DV was positive (subjects heard more
clicks in the right ear), and typically selected the saccade when
the DV was negative (subjects heard more clicks in the left ear).
We quantified this behavior by binning the value of the DV at
the end of the stimulus interval and counting the proportion of
choices of the button press in each bin. The result is shown in
Figure 1C and confirms the impression of Figure 1B. A logistic
regression that regressed the continuous DV on the subjects’
binary choice revealed that the DV is a significant factor in
determining the subjects’ choices (significance of weight of DV in
this model, p < 0.0001, n = 3104). Subjects made both choices in
equal proportion (51.2% of button press choices, not significantly
different from 50%, p = 0.22, proportion test). There was no
influence of a previous choice on the current choice; the choice
proportion was not affected by whether a subject chose a button
press (p = 0.73, proportion test) or a saccade (p = 0.46) on
the previous trial. The subjects’ RT was a function of the absolute
value of the DV at the end of the stimulus period (Figure 1D).
The higher the absolute value of the DV, the faster the subjects
responded (slope of line fit, p < 0.0001).
The amount of information in the stimulus was set such
that each subject made easy and difficult decisions (Section 2).
Consequently, subjects were often sure and often unsure about
their decision. The proportion of trials in which subjects
were sure across the 10 subjects was 61.4 ± 12.9% (mean ±
s.d.). In line with previous behavioral studies (Vickers, 1979;
Baranski and Petrusic, 1998; Koriat, 2011), the level of the
subjects’ confidence was strongly reflected in decision accuracy
(Figure 2A). Specifically, when subjects were sure, they were
correct in 90.0% of trials. In contrast, when they were unsure,
they were correct in only 62.8% of trials (chance was 50%). This
effect was significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p < 0.0001).
There was an influence of a previous confidence report on the
current report. When subjects indicated that they were sure in
the previous trial, the proportion of sure reports increased from
the default 61.4% to 70.2%, and the increase was significant
(p < 0.001, proportion test). When subjects indicated that they
were unsure in the previous trial, the proportion of sure reports
decreased from the default 61.4% to 51.2%, and this decrease was
significant (p < 0.001, proportion test). In accord with previous
studies (Vickers and Packer, 1982; Baranski and Petrusic, 1998),
the level of confidence was strongly reflected in subjects’ reaction
time (RT; Figure 2B). In particular, when subjects were sure, they
reacted faster (mean RT 478ms) than when they were unsure
(mean RT 590ms). This effect was significant (Wilcoxon rank
sum test, p < 0.0001).
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We tested how the subjects’ confidence level is represented
in neural signals recorded using electroencephalography (EEG).
A neural representation of the confidence in a choice could be
confounded by the choice a subject is going to make. This is
because subjects are more likely to choose the option for which
they obtainedmore evidence, and consequently about which they
are more confident, than the option for which they obtained
less evidence, and about which they are less confident (Vickers,
1979). A neural effect of choice, even if binary (Donner et al.,
2009) would, in this way, lead to artificial grading that would be
falsely attributed to the level of choice confidence. We therefore
fixed the effect of choice by specifically investigating trials that
resulted in a button press (n = 1269 trials).We then regressed the
choice confidence, along with terms representing each subject,
on neural features averaged over all channels (Section 2), and
report the significance of the weight of the choice confidence
in this regression. We performed this regression at each time
throughout each button press trial and for the power of the neural
signals at frequencies ranging from 1 to 80Hz, in 1Hz steps
(Section 2).
We report the significance of the weights (the p-values)
instead of the weight magnitude. This is because the individual
factors have different magnitudes and so the associated weights
cannot be readily compared. In contrast, the weight significances
are directly comparable.
Figure 3A shows the effect of the choice confidence, averaged
over all channels, at each time and for each tested frequency
of the neural signals. This analysis reveals that the EEG signals
prominently reflect the subject’s confidence level in choosing
the button press. The effect is particularly pronounced in the
frequency range from about 8 to about 12Hz. This frequency
range aligns with the traditional definition of the alpha band
(Berger, 1969; Pfurtscheller et al., 1996). Thus, we filtered the
neural signals in the alpha band and computed the power of the
resulting signals (Section 2).We then applied the same regression
model, again separately at each time throughout the trial.
Figure 3B (solid line) shows the significance of the weight
of the choice confidence in this regression as a function
of time. The figure reveals that the encoding of choice
confidence by the alpha power reaches prominence at about
400ms following the stimulus onset. The effect progressively
increases and reaches its maximum at 699ms following stimulus
onset. The effect subsequently declines before reaching another,
independent peak of significance briefly prior to a button
press.
We next investigated the effects of the DV. To do so, we
substituted the choice confidence by the DV as a factor in the
regression, ceteris paribus. The significance of the effect of the
value of the DV at each time throughout the trial (Figure 1B)
on the instantaneous value of the alpha power is shown as the
dash-dot line in Figure 3B. The figure reveals that the effect
of the DV emerges somewhat earlier than the effect of choice
confidence. The effect reaches a plateau of significance starting
at about 400ms following stimulus onset, and begins to decline
after reaching the significance peak at 934ms following stimulus
onset—markedly later than the effect of the choice confidence.
The effect vanishes briefly prior to a button press.
We investigated the degree to which the choice confidence and
the DV exert independent leverage on the neural signal. To do
so, we included the DV and the choice confidence as separate
factors in the multiple regression (Section 2, Equation 2). In this
extended regression, we further controlled for the reaction time
(RT), the horizontal position of the eye gaze, and the activity
of forearm muscles (Section 2), by including these factors as
additional regressors on the neural activity in each trial. The
high temporal resolution of EEG allowed us to investigate the
contribution of the instantaneous value of each of these variables
to the neural variability at each time throughout the decision
process.
We found that the choice confidence had an effect on the
neural signal that was partially independent of the effect of the
DV (Figure 3C). As in Figure 3B, the effect of the DV becomes
significant before the effect of the confidence. The effect of the
DV begins to decrease after reaching a peak at 422ms, while at
about this time the effect of confidence starts taking over the
modulatory role. As in Figure 3B, when the data are aligned to
the button press, the choice confidence shows a second distinctive
peak of significance.
Notably, when the data are aligned to the button press,
the neural signal shows an additional prominent effect—a
modulation due to the subject’s RT. This effect reaches a peak
166ms prior to a button press, and vanishes at about the time of
the button press. The finding that neural activity shortly prior to
a movement scales with how long it took a subject to produce the
movement merits separate investigation (Tzagarakis et al., 2010;
O’Connell et al., 2012).
In Figure 3, we averaged the neural features in particular
frequency bands over all channels. This molar analysis approach
guards against multiple comparisons (i.e., comparing multiple
different sets of channels at multiple frequencies). Nonetheless,
the averaging over all channels was not crucial; similar results
were obtained when we chose a parietal subset of electrodes
(e.g, left posterior electrodes Figure 5A). We further repeated the
analysis in Figure 3A for a single parietal channel, channel CP3
(Figure 4). The figure demonstrates similar effects of the choice
confidence over time and frequency as those shown in Figure 3A.
FIGURE 4 | The spectrum of the confidence-related neural effect at a
single parietal channel CP3. Same format as in Figure 3A, for data at a
single parietal channel CP3.
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The effect of the confidence in a button press choice, evaluated
during the period of its significance (solid bar below the
abscissa in Figure 3C) is particularly pronounced in left posterior
regions (channels P3 and CP3, Figure 5A). The effect is to a
reduced degree present also at other channels. However, only
the left posterior regions (Figure 5A) survive the Bonferroni
correction for the number of channels. This localization to the
left hemisphere may be expected given that subjects responded
with the contralateral right hand (Donner et al., 2009). Figure 5B
reveals the dynamics of the alpha band signal in the left posterior
regions. The signal shows an initial activation (Kubanek et al.,
2013). The signal starts to distinguish (p < 0.01, Section 2)
the cases in which a subject is sure (dark red) and in which
a subject is unsure (light red) to choose the button press at
496ms following stimulus onset. When the subject is not sure
to choose the button press (light red), the signal overlaps with
the signal that represents a sure choice of the saccade (dark
blue), until 828ms following stimulus onset. Subsequently, the
light red trace ramps up and reaches a level similar to the sure
choices (dark red) at the time of the button press (solid vertical
line). Notably, the convergence to a common level for button
press choices regardless of the condition has been observed
previously (O’Connell et al., 2012; Kubanek et al., 2013). This
neural effect may manifest the bound that is a crucial property of
the diffusion-to-bound models of decision-making in reaction-
time choice tasks (Stone, 1960; Edwards, 1965; Vickers, 1970;
Gold and Shadlen, 2007).
Compared to the neural signal, the electromyographic (EMG)
activity of the right forearmmuscle flexor carpi radialis is low and
steady throughout the stimulus period (Figure 5C). The muscle
activity becomes prominent only shortly prior to the button
press. The muscle activity starts to significantly distinguish (p <
0.01, Section 2) between the two levels of confidence in a button
press choice at 1020ms following stimulus onset, although this
effect likely reflects the fact that more confident choices lead to
faster responses and so to a faster EMG onset relative to stimulus
onset.
Although subjects were asked not to move during their
performance, we imposed additional measures to eliminate
possible movement-related confounds. In particular, subjects
had to fixate a central target; trials in which subjects broke
fixation were discarded. Furthermore, we measured the EMG
activity of hand muscles, and included the EMG activity as
a separate factor to account for a hand or body movement
A B
C
D
FIGURE 5 | Characterization of the neural effect of the choice
confidence. (A) A rendering of the regions that significantly encode
the weight associated with the choice confidence in the multiple
regression on the alpha-band neural signal, during all button press
choices. The neural signal was averaged over the period of
significance of the confidence effect (solid bar below the abscissa in
Figure 3C). Regions surrounding channels with significant confidence
weights (Bonferroni-corrected, p < 0.05/16) are visualized in hot colors
(see inset). The effect is predominantly observed at left posterior
channels P3 and CP3. (B) Mean ± SEM alpha desynchronization in
left posterior regions (averaged over channels P3 and CP3), as a
function of time. Data are shown separately for sure (thick) and
unsure (thin) choices, and for button press (red) and saccade
choices (blue). The yellow horizontal line labeled with “Criterion”
illustrates the signal threshold used to predict the confidence level in
Figure 8. (C) Mean ± SEM EMG activity of the flexor carpi radialis
muscle of the right hand. (D) Mean ± SEM button press and eye
gaze signals. In B–D, data are aligned on the onset of the stimulus
(left vertical line), the time of movement onset (middle vertical line),
and the time of movement cessation (right dotted vertical line). In
B and C, the signal power was evaluated in 100ms windows,
overlapping by 1 sample (3.9ms).
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(Equation 2). In addition to these measures, we discarded any
trial in which the EEG signals at any channel reached specific
bounds (see Section 2). This procedure eliminated 14.1% of all
trials. This trial-elimination procedure had only minimal effect
on the results (Figure 6). Consequently, we only discarded data
in which subjects broke fixation or responded too soon or too late
(Section 2).
Choices that resulted in a saccade (n = 1331) did not show a
substantial distinction between subjects’ sure and unsure states
(Figure 5B, blue). A distinction appears to be observed first
briefly prior to the saccade (solid vertical line). However, this
effect does not survive the inclusion of the controlling factors
in the multiple regression. In fact, the regression reveals that
this effect is mainly due to the RT (Figure 7). The specificity of
the encoding of the choice confidence to button press choices
suggests that the underlying neural process that is reflected in
the alpha power specifically evolves in circuits pertaining to the
somatomotor system.
Figure 5B shows that the confidence-related neural effect
substantially precedes a button press choice. This finding leads to
the question whether the signal could be used to predict, in each
trial, and using neural signals collected prior to the button press,
whether a subject is sure or unsure to choose the button press. To
test this possibility, we averaged the alpha power over all channels
in the period of the significance of the effect of confidence
(bar below the abscissa in Figure 3C) for all training trials of a
given subject. The averaging over all channels slightly improved
the prediction because the effects of the choice confidence
were, to a reduced degree, observed also at other channels.
The choice confidence separates the resulting neural values
into two (sure and unsure) distributions (Figure 8A). These
distributions are used to set a prediction criterion according to
the experimenter’s demands on the level of type I and type II
misclassification errors. A new, independent test-set (Section 2)
signal value is then compared to the criterion. The classifier
predicts that a subject is going to be sure (unsure) to choose
the button press if that signal value is higher (lower) than the
criterion.
We assessed the accuracy of the predictions from the neural
signals against the confidence levels indicated by each subject on
each trial. Validating the predictions on new, independent test-set
neural signals ensures that the same level of prediction accuracy
could be achieved in real time settings.
The average prediction accuracy as a function of the criterion
is given in Figure 8B. When the criterion moves to the median of
the distribution of the neural signals representing sure choices
(criterion = 1.0), our ability to predict “unsure” should be
high, and our ability to predict “sure” should converge to
chance (50%). This is indeed what we observe (Figure 8B). The
reverse pattern holds when the criterion is aligned with the
median representing unsure choices (criterion = 0.0). Thus, the
criterion can be chosen by the experimenter to meet particular
demands on type I and type II error. We averaged the two
accuracy measures (blue line in Figure 8B) to assign an equal
weight to the trials on which a subject is sure and unsure. The
maximum average accuracy of 60% is achieved midway between
FIGURE 7 | Encoding of the individual factors during saccade choices.
Same procedure and format as in Figure 3C, for all saccade choices.
FIGURE 6 | Effects following a trial elimination procedure. Elimination of trials in which EEG signals at any channel exceeded a particular threshold (Section 2)
had only minimal impact on the confidence-related effect. Same format as in Figure 5B.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 July 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 243
Kubanek et al. Alpha activity reflects choice confidence
the medians of the two distributions—at the criterion value
of 0.55.
The accuracy of the prediction of choice confidence for
this criterion value is given separately for each subject in
Figure 8C. The figure demonstrates that this simple neurally-
informed procedure provides a substantial (up to 66% in
one subject, 60% on average), consistent (all subjects greater
than 50%) and significant (7 out of 10 subjects) ability to
predict a subject’s confidence in an upcoming button press. The
accuracy converges to chance level (50%) when the relationship
between the neural signals and the confidence labels is distorted
(magenta bars aligning with the 50% value in Figure 8C,
Section 2).
In comparison to the neural signal, the activity of the
forearm muscles provided minimal information about the
subjects’ confidence to choose the button press (Figure 5C).
We nonetheless investigated whether it is possible to infer the
confidence in choosing the button press from the EMG activity
of the forearm muscle flexor carpi radialis. Using this signal, we
evaluated the prediction accuracy in the same way and over the
same temporal window as with the neural signal (Figure 8). The
result is shown in Figure 9. The maximum average prediction
accuracy using the muscle signal is 51.5% (chance is 50%) and
is achieved for the criterion value of 0.94. Thus, the ability to
predict a subjects’ confidence in an ensuing button press choice
is contingent upon an access to a signal of the central nervous
system.
Finally, we asked whether the alpha power contributes to the
choice confidence with information beyond that provided by
the other considered variables. To do so, we included the alpha
power, the DV, RT, and the two movement-related variables as
FIGURE 9 | Prediction of the confidence in a button press choice from
forearm muscle activity. Same analysis and format as in Figure 8B, using
the EMG activity of flexor carpi radialis.
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FIGURE 8 | The confidence in a forthcoming button press choice
predicted from the neural signal in single trials. (A) The sure and unsure
choices of a button press are associated with sure and unsure distributions
of values of the neural signal. A new, independent value of the neural signal is
compared to a criterion value. The criterion is set by the experimenter and
takes a value between 0 (value equal to the median of the unsure distribution)
and 1 (value equal to the median of the sure distribution). The scheme
predicts that a subject is going to be sure (unsure) if the neural value is higher
(lower) than the criterion. (B) Average prediction accuracy as a function of the
criterion, separately for sure (thick red) and unsure (think red) choices, and
their average (thick blue). If the criterion is moved to a lower value, such that
it accounts for a larger portion of the sure distribution in (A), the ability to
predict that a subject was sure will be higher (thick red), and the ability to
predict unsure will be close to chance (thin red). Reversely, pushing the
criterion to a higher value, such that it covers more of the unsure distribution,
will improve the ability to predict “unsure” (thin red) and decrease the
accuracy of predicting “sure” (thick red). (C) Average prediction accuracy in
each subject. The criterion value was set to 0.55 [the maximum average
prediction accuracy taken from the blue curve in (B)]. The accuracy using the
same classifier when the sure and unsure class labels are drawn randomly
(and so when the relationship between the neural signal and confidence is
distorted) falls to chance (50%, range 49.9–50.1%; see magenta bars). The
filled blue bars represent values that are significantly (p < 0.05) higher than
the chance accuracy of 50% (Section 2).
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FIGURE 10 | The prediction of subjects’ confidence from the individual
factors. Linear model (Equation 3) in which the individual factors (Section 2)
are regressed on the choice confidence, during all button press choices. To
ensure generalizability, the linear model considered each subject as a random
effect influence on each factor. The weights were normalized (Section 2) so
that a comparison of the weight magnitudes is fair. The error bar denote the
SEM of each weight. For the purpose of visual comparison, the figure shows
the absolute values of the weights. The text gives the actual values. *p < 0.01.
regressors on the choice confidence (Equation 3). We made sure
that the confidence-related effects are not due to only a small
subset of subjects, despite the finding that the effect is prevalent
in most subjects (Figure 8C). To make sure that the effects
are generalizable over a subject population, we considered each
subject as a random effect influence on each factor (Equation 3).
In this analysis, the alpha power was again averaged over
all channels. Similar results were obtained when signals were
measured only at CP3 or P3.
Figure 10 shows that the modeled DV was the most
informative factor in determining how confident a subject was
going to be in choosing a button press (weight equal to 0.68,
weight significance p< 0.001). This is not surprising—the DV
reflects the amount of sensory evidence available to the subject,
as does the confidence. The analysis shows that a knowledge
of the RT is also helpful in determining a subjects’ confidence
[weight −0.43 (the more confident, the shorter the RT), p <
0.001]. The alpha power contributed with substantial additional
information (weight −0.27, p = 0.0022). Subjects’ gaze position
or hand EMG activity did not (p>0.16). Thus, from a perspective
of a judge determining a subject’s confidence, even if the DV
and RT were available to the judge, the alpha power contributes
substantial additional information in determining the subject’s
confidence.
4. Discussion
Many previous studies in animals and several recent studies
in humans have shown that neural signals in several regions
of the brain are modulated by decision-related variables (DV)
in perceptual decision tasks (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001;
Heekeren et al., 2004, 2008; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Tosoni
et al., 2008; Wang, 2008; Andersen and Cui, 2009; Ho et al., 2009;
Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Ratcliff et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al.,
2009; O’Connell et al., 2012; Kubanek et al., 2013). More recently,
studies in animals demonstrate that several regions of the brain
encode variables related to an animal’s confidence in a choice,
and that those signals might be distinct from those encoding the
DVs (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Middlebrooks
and Sommer, 2012; Komura et al., 2013). Here we extended these
findings by investigating whether and how a confidence-related
variable is encoded in human cortical activity in a perceptual
decision task. We found that the degree of a subject’s confidence
in committing to a button press choice is strongly reflected in
cortical activity in the alpha band.
The finding of a modulation of cortical signals by a
person’s confidence in an forthcoming choice is novel.
Previous electrophysiological studies in humans focused on
the investigation of the effects of confidence or awareness on the
error-related negativity signal (ERN) that is specifically observed
following an error (Hewig et al., 2011; Shalgi and Deouell, 2012),
but not on the effect of confidence in an ensuing choice.
A previous study in monkeys (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009)
suggested that the choice confidencemaymodulate neural signals
independently of a DV, even though both the choice confidence
and the DV are based on the amount of information in the
stimulus (Vickers, 1979; Koriat et al., 1980; Vickers and Packer,
1982; Baranski and Petrusic, 1994, 1998; Koriat, 2011). The high
temporal resolution of the EEG allowed us to investigate the
contributions of the choice confidence and the DV to the alpha
activity.We found that the choice confidence had an independent
leverage on the neural signal, and exhibited somewhat different
dynamics than the effect of the DV (Figure 3C). Furthermore,
the neural signal encoded to the choice confidence even when
the DV was taken into account (Figure 10). Although this result
may suggest (as it did in Kiani and Shadlen, 2009) that the
choice confidence and the DV may be partially independent
phenomena, this interpretation must be taken with care. For
instance, it is possible that other forms of DVs, or forms other
than the linear models to test for independence between the
variables, may lead to different interpretations.
A more general criticism of studies investigating neural
representations of choice confidence has been whether the
subjective concept of confidence is a more useful descriptor
than objective, quantitative variables, such as the decision-
related variables (DVs). In particular, deviating from an objective
description of a degree of commitment in a choice (Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001; Heekeren et al., 2004, 2008; Gold and
Shadlen, 2007; Tosoni et al., 2008; Wang, 2008; Andersen and
Cui, 2009; Ho et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Ratcliff
et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2009; O’Connell et al., 2012;
Kubanek et al., 2013) incurs several difficulties. Perhaps the most
notable is that the concept of confidence is intertwinedwithmany
other concepts. When subjects obtain more evidence, they are
typically more confident to make a choice, are faster to make
a choice, and commit less errors (McDougall, 1921; Festinger,
1943; Vickers, 1979; Koriat et al., 1980; Vickers and Packer,
1982; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Baranski and Petrusic, 1994, 1998;
Koriat, 2011; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012). Thus, confidence
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is confounded by sensory evidence, RT, choice correctness or
accuracy, and likely many other variables. It is arguable to
what extent researchers can control for such confounds when
investigating the neural representations of the choice confidence.
Moreover, it is arguable whether making such a distinction is
even useful given the inherent natural relationships between
these variables during decision-making. Another point to keep
in mind is that subjective confidence judgements are likely
affected by many influences that are difficult to control for, such
as a subject’s previous judgment or a subject’s overall level of
confidence.
However, there are three points of merit in establishing that a
signal is a neural correlate of choice confidence.
First, such a signal can provide a window into a subject’s
commitment to make a choice (Figure 5B) without having
to generate a model of a DV (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001;
Heekeren et al., 2004, 2008; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Tosoni
et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2009; Ratcliff et al., 2009; Wunderlich
et al., 2009). This may be beneficial in situations in which experts
make complex decisions that cannot be readily modeled by an
experimenter.
Second, even when a DV can be successfully defined by an
experimenter, our data show that the neural signal can be used
to provide additional independent information about a subject’s
choice confidence (Figure 10).
Third, we found that choice confidence modulates the alpha-
band signal strongly, and the modulation substantially precedes
the time at which a subject commits to a button press. We found
that the level of a subject’s confidence could be read out, in single
trials, from the brain signals recorded prior to the behavioral
outcome (Figure 8). Given a recording during the stimulus
period on a given trial, a simple thresholding classifier trained on
an independent data set predicted whether a subject was going
to be sure or unsure in the button press choice with an average
accuracy of 60%. As a control, the choice confidence could not
be inferred from peripheral muscle signals (Figures 5C, 9). The
finding that a non-invasively acquired neural signal predicts the
confidence in an impending button press choice could be applied
to infer how confident an operator is going to be in committing
to an action. Of course, to arrive to such an application, the
approach would have to be greatly refined in the future.
We designed the task to feature two distinct response effectors,
which allowed us to distinguish whether an effect is specific
to a particular movement system. This helped establish that
the alpha-band signal is modulated by the choice confidence
specifically during button press choices. The specificity of the
choice confidence effect to button press choices excludes the
possibility that the effect could be due to an artifactual influence
(e.g., eye blinks), or due to a generic cognitive process, such as
attention (Gottlieb, 2007; Peck et al., 2009), reward expectation
(Kable and Glimcher, 2009), motivation (Roesch and Olson,
2004), or task difficulty (Chen et al., 2008). Furthermore, this
finding suggests that this neural effect specifically develops in
circuits that are tied to the somatomotor system. This raises the
question whether the effects can be detected in other systems as
well. In this regard, interestingly, the dynamics of the confidence-
related neural effects reported here are similar to those observed
in the monkey oculomotor system (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). In
both studies, a modulation due to choice confidence is apparent
during an early portion of a trial, while a stimulus is still present
[about 400ms relative to stimulus onset in our study compared
to about 300ms—Figure 2D (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009)]. In
both studies, the effects vanish around the time of a movement.
Thus, the dynamics of neural representations of a developing
commitment (confidence) may be similar across effector systems.
Notably, the finding that the alpha power effect of choice
confidence reported here is specific to manual choices does not
preclude the possibility that there are other signals that encode a
subjects’ confidence in a general, effector-independent manner.
Within our paradigm, we did not observe robust confidence-
related signals during saccade choices, but this remains to be
tested in the future, potentially using a more sensitive recording
approach.
Our finding that the neural effect of the choice confidence
or DV was specific to button press choices could reflect an
effect of motor planning (Bestmann et al., 2008). There are
three indications that the effect is not of a purely motor nature.
First, the effect of the choice confidence is observed even after
accounting for movement plans (button presses), i.e., when only
trials that resulted in a button press were considered in the
analysis. Second, the effects of the choice confidence and the DV
during button press choices are significant already early in the
trial (350–400ms following stimulus onset Figure 3B), which on
average is more than a second before a subject performs a button
press. Third, in contrast to the relatively early neural effect, the
EMG activity of the forearm muscles—which directly reflects
motor planning and preparation—was not observed until shortly
prior to a button press (Figure 5). These findings suggest that the
alpha-band neural effect reflects a higher-order decision-related
process that is specifically tied to the somatomotor system.
This is supported by recent findings that alpha-band signals
in perceptual decision tasks reflect decision- and confidence-
related variables already before the onset of a perceptual stimulus
(de Lange et al., 2013; Baumgarten et al., 2014; Lou et al.,
2014).
An action is typically executed when a subject is sure about
performing that action, and withheld when the subject is unsure
(Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Komura et al., 2013). Thus, the
confidence in choosing an action can be thought of as a cognitive
variable that can act on a gate that either gives rise to or inhibits
an action. It has been proposed that the alpha rhythm, the signal
identified in the present study, reflects an operation of a gate
that gives rise to or inhibits an action (Lopes da Silva, 1991;
Mink, 1996; Leblois et al., 2006). In particular, the gating function
is implemented by the thalamo-cortical neuronal interaction,
which appears to modulate the alpha rhythm in regard to
generation or inhibition of an action (Steriade and Llinás, 1988;
Pfurtscheller et al., 1996; Kubanek et al., 2013). Hence, the
alpha rhythm may provide a unique view on the operation of
this subcortical cognitive gate (Saalmann and Kastner, 2009;
Saalmann et al., 2012), and thereby reveal the state of a subject’s
confidence in an upcoming somatomotor action. This hypothesis
provides a set of testable predictions that could be investigated in
invasive studies in the future.
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In summary, cortical alpha activity reflects a variable related
to a degree of a subject’s confidence in an upcoming button press
choice. This effect is marked and independent of movement-
related variables controlled for in this study. This signal provides
a probe into the dynamics of a subject’s deliberation in a forming
decision and enables a prediction of the level of confidence
associated with a forthcoming button press choice.
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